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WAR MAP

AND

HISTORY OF CUBA

INCLUDING THE OPENING
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
American-Spanish War

FROM THE LATEST OFFICIAL AND MOST
AUTHENTIC SOURCES

By LIEUT. E. HANNAFORD

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


MAP OF
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Longitude West from Washington.

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THE HISTORY OF CUBA.

FOLLOWING up the discovery which was to immortalize his name, and the date October 12, 1492, Columbus cruised westward among the West Indian isles, and on October 28th entered the mouth of a river in the "great land" of which he had heard many times before reaching it. This land, indescribably beautiful and fertile, the natives called CUBA. Mistaken as the great discoverer was in fondly believing he had here touched the shores of the great gold-bearing continent he was seeking, the "Gem of the Antilles" is far the most important island of the West Indies—almost incomparably so if Hayti be left out of the account. A climate so delightful as to seem a perpetual summer, a soil inexhaustibly rich, tropical luxuriance of growth in field and forest, varied loveliness of natural scenery, no less than twenty-seven good harbors—these combine to make Cuba one of nature's most favored regions; while its commanding position at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico might well stimulate the acquisitive ambition of nations. "It is so near to us," said President Cleveland's message of December, 1896, "as to be hardly separated from our own territory." The Strait of Florida can be crossed by steamer in five hours.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

Dimensions.—Cuba is about 760 miles in length; in width it varies from 127 miles on a line passing some fifty miles west of Santiago, to not exceeding 28 miles from Havana

southward. Its area is about 41,655 square miles, exclusive of the Isle of Pines and other small islands, the former containing 1,200, the latter aggregating 970 square miles. Thus, in dimensions, Cuba closely approximates the state of New York. Compared with Long Island, it is twenty-eight times larger.

Mountains and Rivers.—Cuba is traversed lengthwise by a mountainous range, which is highest in the eastern part, where also it is broken up into spurs, or transverse ridges. The most elevated summit is 7,670 feet above sea-level, but the average height of the mountains does not exceed 2,200 feet. The rivers are necessarily short, flowing some north, some south, from the central watershed.

Forests and Swamps.—Scarcely more than one third of the land has yet been brought under cultivation. One half the island is covered with primeval forests. The low lands of the coast are inundated in the wet season, or at least turned into impassable swamps of black and wonderfully tenacious mud. Add to this feature the immense reaches of trackless forest, filled everywhere with an almost impenetrable growth of underbrush, not to mention that the dry plains are largely a jungle (*manigua*) of very high bushes and thick grasses, and one may begin to form some idea of the difficulties inseparable from a campaign in this land of tropical suns and lurking fevers.

Strategic Conditions of the War.—The two conditions above described largely account for the surprising paucity of results accomplished for so long a period in the war of 1895-1897 by the vastly preponderant armies of Spain. The insurgent forces, being so inferior numerically, were obliged to remain amid the favoring shelter of the mountains and other inaccessible timbered regions. The necessity of cutting paths through the dense undergrowth of the forests and among the jungled *manigua* of the dry plains accounts for the omnipresence of the machete in the Cubans' warfare. This famous weapon is primarily not a weapon at all, but

an implement designed for hewing a passage through the limitless woody expanses above mentioned. Surprising strength and skill are acquired in wielding this favorite and usually horn-handled blade of from twenty-four to thirty inches in length, perfectly straight, as heavy as a cleaver, with an edge always kept like a razor. It somewhat resembles an American farmer's corn-scythe, only it is made for heavier work, and the cutting is done with the outer edge instead of the inner one. As David before Goliath chose the simple sling, the use of which infinite practice, for entirely different purposes, had given him perfect command, so, in the painful lack of rifles and cartridges, the Cuban belligerent fell back on his trusted machete; and the execution he proved himself capable of doing with it in a sudden rush upon the enemy, or rather, the ferocious climax of a hand-to-hand conflict, is astonishing.

Climate.—The climate of the low coast lands is tropical; that of the more elevated interior resembles the warmer portions of the temperate zone. As regards temperature, it is remarkably equable, making Havana a sanatorium of world-wide celebrity for sufferers from bronchial and pulmonary troubles. The mean annual temperature there is 77 to 80 degrees. Eighty-two degrees is the average for July and August, and 72 for December and January, the total range of the thermometer during the year being only 30 degrees, or from 58 to 88. The average annual rainfall at Havana is 40.5 inches, of which 27.8 inches is during the wet season (middle of April to middle of October). Fireplaces are unknown in Cuba's capital, and almost so are glazed windows, which are replaced by double sets of shutters or curtains.

Yellow fever seldom becomes epidemic in the elevated interior, notwithstanding its prevalence during the summer in Havana and other seaports, whose wretched sanitation constantly invites the attacks of this dreaded scourge.

RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES.

Products.—Cuban sugars and tobaccos are famous the world over. I give them separate sections, and another one to coffee. Next in export value come oranges and the various native woods, including a superior quality of mahogany. The cigar-boxes so familiarly known throughout the United States and Europe are made from a tree of the same natural order as mahogany, the *Cedrela odorata* of Linnæus, but popularly known as cedar, a wood which is also much used for the inside of drawers, wardrobes, etc. The several different species of palms found in Cuba are luxuriant specimens of tropical trees. The Royal palm, rising to the height of one hundred feet or more, is strikingly beautiful and majestic. The cocoanut-palm grows wild, a glorious tree, immensely rich in leaves and fruit. In some seasons oranges have been so abundant that on the great estates, as a traveler declares, they “lay all about on the bright red earth, little naked negroes kicking aside and satiated pigs disdainfully neglecting great luscious fruit which the North would have piled with great pride upon salvers of silver and porcelain.” The banana “bunches” are always cut from the parent stem while green. The official value of the total exports for one year shortly before the last insurrection was upward of \$83,000,000, consisting almost wholly of agricultural products and fruits.

Sugar.—The *ingenios*, or sugar-plantations, with large buildings and mills for sugar-refining, and in connection therewith the distillation of rum, are, and always have been, the most important industrial establishments of the island. Though his former lordliness and feudal magnificence have of late years undergone more or less modification, the great sugar-planter is still a prince of agriculture. He has one great advantage over all his foreign competitors, and that is the fertility of his soil seems practically exhaustless. In Jamaica one to two hogsheads of sugar to the acre has come

to be considered a good yield, while in Cuba three hogs-heads continue to be the average. Not all the bounty-stimulated and cheaper production of beet-sugar in Europe has been able to displace Cuban sugars in foreign markets, though competition from this source has largely reduced the profits in raising them. The introduction of modern machinery requiring large capital has more than counteracted that natural tendency to subdivide great holdings of land which is usually observed when a system of slave labor gives place to a free one, and has aided in crowding the smaller planters to the wall.

In Cuba the grinding season lasts twice as long as it does in Louisiana. Throughout the sugar-raising districts the towering furnace-chimneys of the mills are everywhere the most conspicuous objects. The sugar is put up in jute bags (the government tax on which trebles their cost to the planter), averaging something over three hundred pounds each, and in this shape is sent to Havana or other port. Under conditions of peace the sugar production approximates one million tons per annum. Well-informed Americans consider this only one fifth the amount which, with a good government and proper enterprise, the island is capable of yielding. The average value of sugar exported amounts to \$50,000,000, and of molasses \$9,000,000, of which eighty per cent goes to the United States.

Tobacco.—Tobacco is indigenous to Cuba. As a source of income it ranks next after sugar. Yet the tobacco industry has always been an uncertain one, owing to the restrictions and exactions imposed by the government, which has controlled it as a monopoly, in the interests of the crown and the Spanish officials. An immense contraband trade in cigars is known to exist. The salaries of the officers of the government *Factoria de Tobacco* in Havana have been quoted as high as \$541,000 for a single year. The tobacco crop of Cuba is estimated at about \$10,000,000 annually. The tobacco raisers largely favor the revolution.

For tobacco-raising, the rich plains in the western province of Cuba, Pinar del Rio, have no rival in the world. This is the region which Maceo, commanding the insurgent "Army of Invasion," chose as the principal theater of his operations in the campaign of 1896, and where, in consequence, the tobacco crop of that year was nearly all lost. Riding through the fields just at the critical season for cutting and curing the leaves, his troops enlisted thousands of the laborers and stampeded the rest. The Spaniards, regarding the rebellion and the tobacco interests as largely identical—perhaps not without reason, either—retaliated with ruinous effect wherever their army could penetrate. However, not all the tobacco exported is produced in the western provinces. Ordinarily, large quantities come from the eastern half of the island as well.

Coffee.—This crop formerly came next to sugar in export value, as also in profit to the planters; and although Brazil long since broke down, without entirely destroying, the Cuban coffee trade, the *cafetals*, as the coffee estates are called, are still scattered throughout the island, especially as adjuncts to the great *ingenios*, where their ornamental effects are much prized. Coffee culture was introduced from Hayti in 1748, and fifty years later received a great impetus from the superior methods introduced by intelligent and wealthy French planters, who had fled from the now proverbial "horrors of San Domingo."

Minerals.—Cuba's mineral resources remain but slightly developed. The mountains, wooded to the summit, in places contain iron and copper, both of which, as also manganese, are exported. The city of Santiago de Cuba is the center of a flourishing mining and smelting industry. Though silver ore has been found, and in some of the rivers alluvial gold deposits, Cuba as a producer of the precious metals has always ranked low. Bituminous coal deposits, in extensive layers, seem to constitute the most important item of its mineral wealth.

PEOPLE, CAPITAL, ETC.

Population.—The latest census of Cuba is that which was taken in 1887, as follows:

PROVINCES.	WHITE.	COLORED.	TOTAL.
Havana	344,417	107,511	451,928
Pinar del Rio.....	107,160	58,731	225,891
Matanzas.....	143,169	116,401	259,570
Santa Clara.....	244,345	109,777	354,122
Puerto Principe.....	54,252	15,557	67,789
Santiago de Cuba	157,980	114,339	272,319
Total.....	1,111,303	520,316	1,631,619

As regards density, this population is distributed very unevenly in the several provinces, being per square kilometer (a kilometer is within a fraction of five eighths of an English mile) as follows: Santiago de Cuba, 7.75; Puerto Principe, 2.10; Santa Clara, 15.34; Matanzas, 30.59; Havana, 52.49; Pinar del Rio, 15.09. The population of the state of New York, a little larger than Cuba, in 1890 was 5,997,853.

Religion and Education.—The government recognizes but one religion—the Roman Catholic. Education has been greatly neglected, anything in the nature of public schools for the benefit of the people in general being entirely unknown. One of the grievances of the Cuban patriots for generations lies along this line.

City of Havana.—The famous capital of Cuba, which is also the commercial center of the West Indies, is the oldest city founded by Europeans in America, dating from 1519. Its harbor is very fine. It is the foremost tobacco and sugar market of the world, and manufactures cigars in immense quantities. The census of 1887 showed a population of 200,448. The city, which is made up of the “old” and “new” towns, the latter outside the old walls, has

handsome suburbs, besides many and beautiful public parks and promenades.

Havana is a metropolis of wealth, good living and general luxury, with an abundance of cafes and restaurants, fairly rivaling those of Paris. It is massively built, mostly of stone, and paved with granite or other stone equally hard, as being the best material for this land of prodigious rains and flaming suns. A well-known American journalist, recently returned from Havana, designates it a city of palaces fronting on alleys, some of the principal thoroughfares, sidewalks and all, having a width of only twenty-five feet, and none of the streets being kept clean. The Cathedral of Havana, venerable and imposing without, ornate and brilliant within, has in its keeping (unless an almost incredible fraud was perpetrated in 1796) the priceless treasure of the bones of Columbus, in a marble urn. Moro Castle, at the entrance of the harbor, is quite celebrated, lastly as the dreary prison of political offenders, including more than one American. For harbor defense, however, the main reliance is some newer fortifications on the neighboring hills.

Other Cities.—Santiago de Cuba comes next to Havana in population. It contained 71,307 in 1892, while Matanzas had 56,379, Puerto Principe 46,641, and Cienfuegos 40,964. (An enumeration was made in the cities in 1892, but it was not general throughout the island.)

Communications.—There are 1,000 miles of railroad in regular operation, in times of peace, throughout the island, besides about 200 miles of private lines running to the large sugar-plantations, and which, during the war of 1895-1897, were more or less completely destroyed. The telegraph lines aggregate 2,810 miles. The number of vessels that entered the five principal ports—Havana, Santiago, Cienfuegos, Trinidad and Nuevitas—in 1894 was in round numbers two thousand, with a tonnage of two and one half millions.

CUBA UNDER SPAIN.

Early Spanish Rule.—Forty years of cruel and rigorous servitude sufficed to blot the three hundred thousand gentle, indolent aborigines of Cuba off the face of the earth. For a long time the island continued sparsely settled, its wondrous agricultural capabilities surprisingly unappreciated. The Spanish vessels passing between the New World and the home ports of Cadiz and Barcelona invariably made the harbor of Havana; that city quickly grew into importance, but the rest of the island lay neglected. Meanwhile the West Indian waters were churned into bloody foam whenever war arose in Europe. Here would assemble the French, the English, the Dutch navies, and here they dealt some of their most telling blows upon the power of Spain at sea. Havana was destroyed by a French privateer in 1538, and again in 1554, and in 1624 the Dutch captured it, but gave it back to Spain. During two centuries the rich Spanish galleons offered an irresistible temptation to hostile seamen and swarming bucanears.

English Conquest of 1762.—The conquest of Havana and other important points in Cuba by the English in 1762 was a striking feat of arms, which, strange as it sounds, owed its success to a timely reinforcement of 2,300 men, under General Lyman and Lieutenant-colonel Israel Putnam, from the colonies of Connecticut, New York and New Jersey. The resistance of the Spaniards cost the victors dearly, most of all in an appalling death-rate from disease, exposure and lack of water. The spoil taken was enormous, that part of it which was divided among the British soldiers and sailors as prize-money amounting to about \$4,000,000. Lord Albemarle and Sir George Pocock each pocketed about \$600,000. English statecraft never made a worse bargain than when it gave Cuba back to Spain in 1763, in exchange for a barren title to Florida. Had England held Cuba, French assistance in the Revolution might have been futile,

and possibly George III. would have had his way, instead of Washington and Hancock having theirs.

From 1763 to 1873.—English domination lasted scarcely a twelvemonth, but that was enough to impart a decided impetus to the industries of the island. The replacement of the iron and bloody hand of Spain retarded, but did not check, the development of Cuba's marvelous resources. When the French deposed the reigning family in Spain, in 1808, Cuba declared war against Napoleon. Nor was this sentiment of loyalty subverted by the example of successful revolt on all sides. Spain lost Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chili, etc., but Cuba remained her prize, with only one disturbance of note, the Black Eagle Conspiracy of 1829, amid it all. However, because of government (since 1810) by a foreign captain-general, also because of the heavy taxation, a discontent was breeding, which gradually hardened into opposition, hatred and defiance after 1836, when Cuba was denied a share in the benefits of the new constitution granted the mother-country. The antagonisms of race likewise came into play, and 1844 brought the short-lived insurrection of the blacks. In 1848 President Polk offered Spain \$1,000,000 for the island, but encountered an indignant refusal. In 1851 Narcisso Lopez, a Venezuelan and a filibusterer, led a much-vaunted expedition from one of our southern ports into its death-trap in the western part of Cuba, and was garroted. The famous Ostend Manifesto by the United States ministers to England, France and Spain was issued in 1854, declaring that if Spain would not sell, this country should seize Cuba by force and annex it. The three movements last mentioned were conceived in the interest of slavery extension. In 1873 occurred the tragic Virginius incident, when Captain Fry, of that ill-fated vessel, and fifty-two other American prisoners were shot at Santiago as "pirates." In 1889, Sagasta, the Spanish premier, told the United States minister there was not gold enough in the world to buy Cuba.

War of 1868-1878.—The year 1868 inaugurated a determined effort for Cuban independence, under the military leadership of Maximo Gomez, a retired officer and native West Indian. The war dragged its weary length for ten years, its operations being limited to the eastern third of the island. It was finally terminated by the treaty of El Zanjón, between Cespedes, the civil head of the revolutionary movement (Gomez and most of the generals assenting), and Captain-general Martinez Campos. This treaty was hailed with delight by all; by the Cubans as also a guarantee of autonomy, and of personal rights and privileges, and equal protection under the law. Gomez then retired to his family and little farm in Santo Domingo. The "ten years of ruin and of tears" for Cuba had cost Spain \$60,000,000, and 100,000 men, most of them by yellow fever. Of course, the expenses of the war were saddled on Cuba.

CAUSES OF DISCONTENT.

Injustice and Oppression.—The Cuban patriots always claimed that the treaty of El Zanjón (see preceding paragraph) became a hollow mockery in the hands of its Spanish administrators. Names only were changed, not methods. The title of captain-general gave place to governor-general, but it was the same office, the same arbitrary, irresponsible power, as before. The right of banishment was nominally given up, but a "law of vagrancy" was framed, which accomplished precisely the same end. The brutal attacks on defenseless citizens were prohibited, but under a new and soft Castilian name they still went on, and remained unpunished. Taxation without the knowledge or consent of the Cubans themselves was, as ever, the core of the whole fiscal system. The groundwork of the administrative policy remained the same; namely, to exclude every native Cuban from every office which could give him effective influence in public affairs, and to make the most out of the colonists' labor for the benefit of Spain,

The Spaniards never conceived any other policy than that the helpless Cubans were in duty bound to maintain the manufactures of Spain, and be doubly taxed—once as goods went, and again as goods came—for the privilege of the exchange. The government at Madrid was always on the alert to issue decrees whose effect would be to cheapen sugar and tobacco, the two great Cuban products, and at the same time to compel the importation by Cuba of many things which she ought to raise in her own fields or fabricate in her own shops, the only consideration being how to raise the largest revenue possible, by an export duty on the former and a tariff duty on the latter. The oppression this policy wrought was greatly aggravated by the all-pervading corruption in the custom-houses. Spain practically confiscated the product of the Cubans' labor without giving them in return either safety or prosperity, nor yet education. She systematically impoverished Cuba, while demoralizing its people by condemning them to political inferiority.

The Cuban deputies were never able to accomplish anything in the Cortes at Madrid; in fact, few of them really attempted anything, the majority owing their places to distinctly Spanish influence. The vast sums amassed by taxes multitudinous, searching, grasping, were raised and spent, not for roads, not for schools, not for improvements, not for developing internal resources, but for the enrichment and indulgence of a swarm of overbearing foreigners. A popular way of putting the case was that Spain had fastened on Cuba a debt of \$200,000,000, considerably over \$100 per capita, and in addition a system of taxation which wrung \$39,000,000 annually from the Cubans. Nor is this severe indictment much of an exaggeration.

The Spanish Side.—On the other hand, the Spanish officials protested that the political regime had been entirely transformed on the treaty lines. The island was immediately divided into its present six provinces. The

last vestige of slavery was removed in 1886, two years before the limit set. (Concerning this, the Cubans insist that the ten years' war had killed slavery anyhow, and the royal decrees were simply its obituary.) The promised constitutional reforms, according to this view, were carried out in good faith, including, besides Cuban representation in the Cortes, a considerable extension of the suffrage and of the principle of self-government, the promotion of education, the legalizing of civil marriages, etc. Cuba, in short, was a spoiled child. The revolutionary leaders were pestiferous cranks and adventurers, the Maceos—who were mulattoes—being particularly obnoxious, as inciters of revolt among the blacks.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

The Cuban Junta.—The Cuban exiles at Key West and other Florida points, as also New York City, with those in the non-Spanish West Indies, Mexico, Honduras and Venezuela, numbered many thousands, including numerous veterans of the ten years' war; and these lived in perpetual ferment over some project or other for the liberation of Cuba, always keeping in close touch with their compatriots there. The obvious desirability of a union of effort led to the formation of a supreme Revolutionary Junta, with New York City for headquarters, and for its master spirit that indomitable and tireless organizer, Jose Marti. Before the end of 1894 the Junta had the moral and material support of nearly one hundred and fifty revolutionary clubs, all actively at work in raising a war fund and purchasing arms and ammunition. The Cuban cigar-makers, etc., in the United States pledged to the cause one tenth of their earnings, or more if needed. At the same time their friends at home were stealthily adding to the limited supply of arms that had been secreted there since the war closed in 1878, doing so mostly by smuggling them in, or by purchase from corrupt underlings at the government

arsenals. The most prized of these acquisitions were one thousand Mausers, a repeating rifle of high repute, first used in the German army.

A "filibustering expedition" was broken up January 14, 1895, at Fernandina, Florida, when on the eve of sailing. Its leaders, General Antonio Maceo and Jose Marti, were next heard of in February, in San Domingo, whither they had gone to concert further measures with their fellow-partisans living in Cuba. It was at this period that Marti, president of the Revolutionary Junta, made his way to a modest home in the western part of San Domingo, and to the same able and wily soldier, veteran of a dozen wars, who had led the last Cuban army, officially tendered the organization and the command of the Cuban army of the future. And Maximo Gomez accepted.

Desultory Outbreaks.—The program agreed on contemplated a rising in all six provinces on February 24, 1895. This is the date of the revolutionists' formal declaration of war, though they were then able to raise the flag of the republic in but three provinces, only one of which seemed the theater of events at all threatening. Disturbances were reported in Matanzas and Santa Clara, that in the former having for one of its two ringleaders the colored editor of a popular Havana daily newspaper; but these were soon quelled by the capture or dispersion of the insignificant rebel forces, the colored editor promptly accepting a pardon at the hand of Governor-general Calleja.

The province of Santiago de Cuba is for the most part thinly settled, which, with its generally mountainous and densely wooded character, makes it an ideal territory for guerrilla warfare; besides, from San Domingo, just across the Windward Passage, any craft larger than a skiff can gain its coast readily. The landing there, February 24th, of a little party of hostile Cubans aroused the Spanish authorities to a sense of annoyance—scarcely more. But the handful of insurgent guerrillas playing hide-and-seek

in the mountains and the swamps found welcome, succor, reinforcements, wherever they appeared. Then came the unearthing of a widespread plot in this same province that occasioned genuine alarm, the conspirators' plans including wholesale conflagrations, and the extermination of the Spanish officials and soldiery, beginning with the resident governor. Calleja proclaimed martial law in Santiago, also in Matanzas, and hurried detachments to both. Out of a nominal army of 20,000 he could only put 9,000 effectives into the field, while of thirteen gunboats on patrol duty along the coast no more than seven were fit for service. The commissary arrangements were so bad as to more than once block important movements of the troops. The almost daily story of the telegraph would be the appearance in such or such a district of an insurrectionary band, which at the approach of troops vanished into the mountains or the swamps—where pursuit was impossible—reappearing in a few days as raiders on such and such Loyalists' plantations, which they not only plundered, but enticed the laborers away from, thus terrorizing the community and ruining the prospects for a crop.

Drawbacks.—Government circles in Havana admitted there was an epidemic of brigandage. Proceedings in line with this characterization did discredit the popular uprisings in some districts, where predatory outlaws pushed themselves to the front, displacing more reputable leaders. Another dampener for the patriotic ardor of many was the overshadowing prestige of the more numerous negroes or mulattoes in many of the rebel detachments. These two disparaging associations led some thousands of original enthusiasts for *Cuba libre* to abandon the cause a few months later, and avail themselves of the amnesty proclaimed by Campos. The Cuban patriots also felt keenly the do-nothing attitude of the Autonomists. (See next paragraph.) The Central Junta of this important party at Havana was induced in April to issue a manifesto support-

ing the government, and strongly deprecating a recourse to war. However, many individuals belonging to the party who were living elsewhere in the island—especially those in Santa Clara province—as soon as they could do so without danger of immediate arrest, came out as revolutionists.

Three Parties.—Of the three parties in Cuba—Loyalists, Separatists and Autonomists—the first comprises those of Spanish birth or Spanish patronage—the office-holding class, and all others whose privileges and interests are bound up with a continuance of the present regime. The Separatists are the party of revolution, of *Cuba libre*, ready to fight for independence as the only remedy for their country's ills. The Cubans in the United States, as well as the thousands of other exiles in the lands and islands neighboring Cuba, belong to this party almost to a man, and so, by racial instinct, does the negro population. The Autonomists occupy middle ground, passionately inveighing against the misgovernment, favoritism and centralization which disgrace the present state of things, yet limiting their demands to home rule under Spain, such as Canada enjoys under England.

CAMPAIGN OF 1895.

Maceo and Gomez in Cuba.—Taking up now the main thread of war history, it was the thirty-first of March when Antonio Maceo, with sixteen comrades of the former war, sailed from Costa Rica and landed near Baracoa, on almost the eastern tip of Cuba. Intercepted by a mounted Spanish party, they kept up a brave though shifting fight for many hours, and after several of his companions had fallen and his hat been shot through, Maceo managed to elude his pursuers and get away. For ten days he continued his stealthy progress westward through the woods, living on the plantains and other tropical fruits that grow wild in Cuba. At length, in the rough country north of Bahia de Guantnamo, he stumbled upon a body of rebels, and iden-

tifying himself, was welcomed with rapturous enthusiasm. His was indeed a name to conjure with, because of his famous deeds in the last war and his unquenchable devotion to *Cuba libre*. At once he took command of the insurgent bands in the vicinity, and began recruiting vigorously. In three sharp brushes that he presently had with small Spanish detachments he more than held his own, the moral effect of which was especially valuable. Since 1878 the mulatto chieftain had become a traveled and for all practical purposes an educated man. The art of war he had made a close study, out of books and in every other way he could find. That he served, at one time, in the capacity of hostler at West Point is a myth. His only surviving brother, Jose, who had come over from Costa Rica with him, was also given a generalship, and fell during the war, a number of months before him.

On the eleventh of April Maximo Gomez and Jose Marti together succeeded in crossing over from San Domingo, and landing on the southern coast. The district was alive with the enemy's patrols and pickets, so that for two days they were in constant danger; but ere the third evening they were safe within a rebel camp, and Gomez had entered upon his duties as commander-in-chief. Experienced leadership, their great lack at first, the rebels now had. Soon they numbered over six thousand men.

Death of Marti.—Marti and Gomez, having marched toward the central provinces, intent on arranging for a Constituent Assembly, as well as organizing insurrection, the former, on May 19th, was led into an ambush by a treacherous guide. Gomez heard the firing, and galloped to the scene, but Marti had already been killed. A furious hand-to-hand fight ensued for possession of the corpse, but, Gomez receiving a painful wound, his inferior force was obliged to retire. Marti was the father, and thus far had been the soul, of the revolution. His body, after it had been embalmed, was borne to the city of Santiago, where

it was buried by the Spanish commandant. It is said that he and his associates of the Junta had raised a million dollars for the cause of revolution.

Plans of Campaign.—The few battalions of recruits hurried over from Spain at the first call of Calleja (who had likewise got 7,000 troops from the other Spanish island of Porto Rico) were followed, in April, by no less than 25,000 men. On the sixteenth of that month Field-marshal Campos, to the joy of the Spaniards, reached the port of Santiago de Cuba, on his way to Havana, relieving Calleja as governor-general. He took hold with energy. But his task grew daily, the contagion of revolt continuing to spread westward, and, in spite of the inadequate supply of arms and ammunition, to gather military strength. Calleja had weeks before proclaimed the whole island under martial law. By May the Havana officials conceded they were coping with revolution. Sharp fighting at outlying points, though never between large numbers—heavy skirmishing—had now grown common. No longer were the Spaniards trying to ferret out a despised enemy in his hiding-places; for the rainy season, with its added discomforts and increased peril to life, was now on, and at best that kind of work was wearing and fruitless. All through the war the insurgents, secure in the good-will of the masses, have enjoyed the great advantage of being kept fully informed of every move the government troops made; so now the rebels always gave the Spaniards the slip, or on occasions would attack their columns from ambush.

The aim of Campos was to divide the island into zones by a series of strongly guarded military lines running north and south, and, while his flying columns would give the sandwiched rebels no rest, to move his successively consolidated forces toward the sunrise, and finally crowd the Cubans off the eastern end of the island. As it turned out, however, it was Gomez and Maceo who fiddled and Campos who danced. The governor-general had to keep

shifting his drooping and water-soaked regiments from point to point, to meet threatened attacks or to protect this district or that from ruinous rebel incursions, and could not solidify even the two trochas he did begin.

Gomez adapted means to ends. Pitched battles and regular sieges were, with his limited resources, out of the question. The armies of oppression could not be crushed, but they might be harassed and their convoys cut off, might be worn out in a life of alarms and hard work, might be picked off in detail—and yellow fever would do the rest. His hardened native soldiers, especially the negroes, would thrive and keep in fighting trim under hardships and exposure no European could undergo and live.

Campos Outmatched.—By the fourth week of May the rebel armies numbered over 10,000 men, of whom nearly three fourths were armed with good rifles. The Spanish war expenses in three months had been \$10,000,000, and their death-roll 190 officers and 4,846 men. Early in June Gomez put his plans into execution for the invasion of Puerto Principe, and brushing aside the attenuated opposition in his way, was soon in the heart of his old campaigning ground in the 70's, with thousands flocking to his standard. Three weeks later Maceo, still in Santiago province, concentrated his forces in the Holguin district, moved southwestward, and demonstrated heavily against Bayamo, capturing train after train of provisions that were started for that place. Campos put himself at the head of 1,500 men, with General Santocildes next in command, and marched to the relief of the starving garrison. July 13th, several miles before reaching Bayamo, he was attacked by 2,700 rebels led by Maceo, and with his entire staff narrowly escaped capture. Only the heroism of Santocildes averted this catastrophe, at the cost of his own life. For five hours the Spaniards, with admirable steadiness, fought their assailants on four sides, being surrounded, but finally broke through, and made good their escape to Bayamo, the rear-

guard with difficulty covering their retreat. They had been saved by Maceo's lack of artillery. The Spanish loss in killed was seven officers and 119 men; that of the Cubans was nearly as great. But Maceo, by a rapid flank movement and a tremendous assault upon the enemy's rear, had captured the ammunition train—a prize indeed. Campos did not dare to stir from Bayamo for several days, or until strong reinforcements had reached him. By this time Maceo had brought about the concentration against him of 10,000 of the enemy. Withdrawing now, in a night he was out of reach.

By early August the Spanish losses by death had reached 20,000 men; by September 1st their expenditures to \$21,300,000. The Madrid government, after already realizing \$48,000,000 from the sale, at 40 per cent, of \$120,000,000 worth of Cuban bonds of the series of 1890, in October negotiated a \$14,000,000 loan with some Paris and Dutch bankers.

Autumn Campaign.—Campos had massed his troops at commanding points on the railroads and along the trochas, while the commercial seaports, besides being strongly garrisoned, were under the sheltering guns of the Spanish war-ships. The other side had planned to kindle the fires of revolution all over the island, and compel the government to scatter its forces. The heavy reinforcements dispatched from Spain in August, unlike the earlier ones, were mainly veterans, the flower of the Spanish army. A few thousand volunteers had also been recruited in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, and these, it was thought, a few weeks would thoroughly acclimate for any service.

September found not only 30,000 rebels in the field, but their number increasing faster than ever. And now began their destructive and dreaded work of dynamiting trains, bridges, etc., tearing up tracks and cutting telegraph lines, as also their more systematic levies of “contributions” upon the planters, and of taxes upon food supplies for the cities. More fighting, too, but always of the partisan kind;

for unless two or three times the stronger, no insurgent force would either attack or wait to be attacked. They knew every foot of ground, all the negroes and three fourths of the whites formed a spy service for them, and when it came to marching, the imported regulars were nowhere. They worried and stung the Spanish columns and outposts perpetually, always making off before an effective blow could be dealt in return. When their ammunition ran low, they would swoop down upon some exposed party of the enemy and replenish from the prisoners' cartridge-boxes.

October saw 25,000 government troops in the province of Santa Clara alone—there were indications the tiger was about to make another spring out of his jungle. Sure enough, in his own time, Gomez rushed his columns by night over into Santa Clara. The combat of November 19th and 20th, at Taguasco, in that province, was the severest encounter of the year, Gomez gaining a decided advantage over Valdes, one of the Spanish brigadiers. Before the end of 1895 Campos' campaign was an admitted failure. Under a heavy fire of criticism from the ultra-Spanish Havanese because he would not depart from the humane and considerate policy he had all along pursued, the once-lauded "Pacifier of Cuba" at the new year returned to Spain. Both sides now had in the field three times as many men as in the ten years' war, the government about 200,000 men, counting 60,000 volunteers—home guards—and the loosely organized and wonderfully mobile insurgent armies 50,000 to 65,000.

CAMPAIGN OF 1896.

The Torch and Grass-grown Fields.—Less blood and more fire gives the second year's campaign in an epigram. The Cuban leaders in December, 1895, had announced that their next move would be to stop production and commerce, and thus deprive the Spanish crown of war revenues and supplies. Thus, too, the situation would

become so intolerable that Loyalist and Autonomist would cease opposing independence, for they would see it was the only alternative to anarchy and ruin. So Gomez again took up his line of march westward to the confines of Santa Clara, and across Matanzas, and into the province of the capital; which, as completed by Maceo's lodgment in Pinar del Rio, made a march of triumph for the Cubans of the whole length of their country, or about as far as from Pittsburg to St. Louis. Gomez had got hold of a few pieces of artillery, and the thunder of his guns at almost the back door of Havana was the greeting he gave the new governor-general, Valeriano Weyler, who arrived early in February. His march had lain through the cultivated, rich sugar districts, and these he left a smoking desolation. Then Maceo, like a thunderbolt, burst into Pinar del Rio, where he did a corresponding work, though not the same one, in the tobacco regions; and in Pinar del Rio he staid, in spite of all efforts to capture him or starve him out.

The Trochas.—Trocha simply means a military line of fortified posts, near together, designed to bar an enemy's passage beyond. The Spaniards always placed great reliance on their trochas as a means of cooping up the enemy, and, as it were, strangling rebellion to death. Yet Gomez in the ten years' war crossed and recrossed them several times, once bringing his wife with him. Those which Campos established in 1895 soon had to be abandoned as useless. His last was along the line of railroad running from Havana to Batabano, on the south coast, a distance of twenty-eight miles; and, in addition to the usual forts, hundreds of freight-cars were covered with boiler-iron, their sides perforated with openings for the rifles of his soldiery, and some of these were kept moving up and down the line day and night. On the evening of January 4, 1896, Gomez and Maceo crossed this trocha without firing a shot, but tore up three miles of railroad track, "just to let the Spaniards know we noticed their toy," Gomez said.

In 1896 Weyler threw two trochas across the island, one in the western part of the province of Puerto Principe (see map), from Jucaro to Moron. The western one was shorter and stronger than any before it, and at first much the most talked of. It extended twenty-three miles from Pto. de Mariel on the north to B. Majana on the south, just within the eastern boundary of Pinar del Rio. (See map.) Its object was to shut Maceo up in the province just named, and make the assurance doubly sure of cutting the revolutionary army in two.

Death of Maceo.—After passing the trocha with a small detachment on the night of December 4, 1896, Maceo (on his way to consult with Gomez) was killed on the seventh; assassinated, the Cubans claimed, through the purchased treachery of Dr. Zertucha, of his personal staff. His eight brothers had all perished before him in the cause of Cuban liberty. He was succeeded by General Rius Rivera.

CAMPAIGN OF 1897.

Situation in January.—The year of 1897 dawned upon a situation which for Spain was intensely strained, financially, and scarcely less so from the military and diplomatic standpoints, with gloom and mourning throughout the patriot ranks for the death of Maceo, though the Cuban Junta asserted, a few weeks later, it had received a quarter of a million dollars in the way of increased contributions because of it. "Meanwhile," says a trustworthy account of that period, "in one of the fairest lands on earth the misery, the suffering, goes on without mitigation. Thousands are in sudden extreme penury, many on the verge of starvation, and from one end of the island to the other there is a complete unsettling of everything. The *pacifcos*, or non-combatants, are rudely hustled about by the Spanish soldiery, and any informer's tale may seal the death-warrant of a number of them, as if they were so many cattle. Weyler, though he has not proved himself

the butcher he was dubbed beforehand, is harsh and relentless, and some of his orders have worked indescribable hardship and privation to multitudes of country people. His forces continue to garrison the seaports, and hold certain interior lines along the railroads, including the western and eastern trochas, but the insurgents have their own way in nearly all of the eastern two thirds of the island, and are able to raid at will over much of the rest."

Strength of the Two Armies.—The numerical strength of the opposing armies at this time had not greatly changed since the close of 1895. (See page 23.) Additional reinforcements from Spain, though reaching Havana frequently, did not much more than replace the heavy Spanish losses resulting from exposure and disease. The Cuban armies, according to a speech in the United States Congress, then aggregated 60,622 men; 5,000 each under Gomez and Maceo, and 6,700 under other commanders, these 16,700 constituting the Army of Invasion; and 43,922 in the Army of Occupation, scattered throughout the six provinces as follows: Santiago de Cuba, 13,900; Puerto Principe, 2,500; Santa Clara, 5,000; Matanzas, 8,800; Havana, 8,160; Pinar del Rio, 5,562. Of the twenty-four generals in the Cuban armies, nineteen were whites, three blacks, one a mulatto and one an Indian; and of the thirty-four colonels, twenty-seven were whites, five blacks and two mulattoes.

Paper Pacifications.—Upon Maceo's death Weyler put forth increased efforts to crush out rebellion in Pinar del Rio. By means of the western trocha he succeeded in confining Rivera's scattered bands to that province, and in a series of small engagements he gained some advantages; but there was a continuous stream of wounded and sick soldiers back to Havana. In the spring of 1897 Rivera, wounded, was made prisoner, after which event military operations in Pinar del Rio became absolutely unimportant. Rivera was released a few months later, and already is well-nigh forgotten. On January 11, 1897,

Weyler proclaimed the pacification of the three western provinces, those of Havana, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio; then made haste to show the hollowness of it all, not only by unrelaxed activity in Pinar del Rio, but by a campaign of ruthless devastation throughout Matanzas. His further "pacifications," at intervals during the summer, deceived nobody. As autumn approached, the fruitlessness of his harsh policy aroused strong criticism even in Madrid.

Autumn Campaign.—The two eastern provinces, Santiago and Puerto Principe, were dominated by the insurgents from the very first. It cost the Spaniards continual severe effort and many lives to retain their hold on the Bayamo district. More than once the garrison of that place were reduced to almost starvation allowances, by the cutting of the railroad to the north, thus making them dependent on such supplies as could be brought up the Rio Cauto (see map) by boat. In January, 1897, a Spanish gunboat patrolling that river, was blown up by a torpedo operated electrically from the woods along the shore. During the greater part of that year the more important demonstrations of the insurgents were those made by various detachments of the army of General Calixto Garcia, now the next in rank to Gomez, and, like him, a veteran of the ten years' war; though the heavily guarded and formidably strengthened Jucaro-Moron trocha long prevented any junction with the commander-in-chief, who was having a watchful, but by no means sanguinary, time in Santa Clara province, or, as the Cubans call that region, El Camaguey.

Strangely confused and meager were the accounts of military operations in Cuba throughout 1897. The insurgents were playing a waiting game. The most striking success their side achieved was Garcia's capture of the important fortified post of Victoria de las Tunas, northwest of Bayamo (see map), on the thirtieth of September, after

three days' fighting, in which the Spanish commander was killed, and the beleaguered garrison had a casualty list of forty per cent, the rest surrendering. The Cubans, who also lost heavily, owed their victory to Garcia's recent artillery re-enforcements—two heavy and six rapid-fire guns worked by a little band of Americans. A young Missourian, writing home, declared they captured "twenty-one forts, over a thousand rifles, a million rounds of ammunition and two Krupp cannon." It was now that Weyler, in the interest of the officers captured at Tunas, made his first and only exchange of prisoners with the Cubans. As he had cabled that Tunas was "impregnable," its fall occasioned deep chagrin and severe criticism in Madrid; nor did these abate, notwithstanding Weyler's early reoccupation of the place, the rebels having left.

RECONCENTRATION HORRORS.

President McKinley's Description.—Not on the prowess of her armies, however, but on her cold-blooded policy of "reconcentration," Spain had long since come to place her main reliance for subduing the rebellion. The Cuban laboring classes, the common country people, all sympathized with the cause of *Cuba libre*; they must be taken in hand, and put where neither they nor the food they were accustomed to raise could aid the insurgent bands. "The cruel policy of concentration," said President McKinley's message of December, 1897, "was initiated February 16, 1896. The productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste, and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late cabinet of Spain [that of Canovas] justified as a necessary measure of war, and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination."

In his memorable special message to Congress, April 11, 1898, the President said: "The efforts of Spain added to the horrors of the strife a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian people. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by Captain-general Pando on October 21, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by military occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwellers in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrisoned towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed or fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support, was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties, and executed by all the powers at their disposal."

Starvation and Suffering.—"By the time the present administration took office, a year ago," continues the President, "reconcentration, so called, had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 300,000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions.

"As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates, from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados from starvation and the diseases thereto incident exceeded

50 per centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called zones of cultivation that were established within the immediate area of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, or aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed or shelter, to provide for their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not a civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave."

American Protests.—Exactly that which had been predicted by the Cuban Junta and the better informed portion of the American press thus came to pass, only in form more horrid still. "But some doubted," and among them were United States Senators and Congressmen. A party of these, including Senators Proctor, of Vermont; Gallinger, of New Hampshire; and Thurston, of Nebraska, experienced a harrowing awakening when they visited Cuba early in March, 1898, and with their own eyes beheld the hopeless, unspeakable misery of the famishing "reconcentrados;" and the subsequent speeches of the three Senators just mentioned produced a powerful effect. The wife of Senator Thurston was in delicate health; her sympathetic nature received so great a shock from the dreadful scenes the party everywhere encountered, that she died on the trip. Under the law of nations, had the helpless reconcentrados been fortunate enough to be her prisoners of war, Spain must have provided for them; but as they were only simple peasantry, and mostly women, children and broken-down old men at that, she could and did take steps to starve upward of half a million of them

into the grave, and it was no person's business in particular to demand the reason why, till a few wide-awake American newspapers exposed, and kept on exposing, the enormities that were going on. By May, 1898, not less than a quarter of a million reconcentrados had died of slow starvation and disease.

Against this abuse of the rights of war the American government repeatedly and earnestly protested. Finally, in October, 1897, the Spanish government conceded certain relief measures (see page 33), and subsequently made a great display of others, but they were miserably inadequate, and did not meet the real situation.

Relief Measures.—Hundreds of Americans came within the scope of reconcentration. Largely upon the representations of General Fitzhugh Lee, the lion-hearted United States Consul-general at Havana, President McKinley, very early in his administration, requested, and Congress granted, \$50,000 for their relief, including the return to the United States of such of them as desired it. Nearly the whole amount had been expended, under the direction of the American consular authorities, before those officials withdrew from the island in the fore part of April, 1898.

During the autumn of 1897 the conviction grew strong that the Red Cross Association ought to undertake the mitigation of the terrible suffering in Cuba. Clara Barton, president of the American section of that noble organization, was still in Armenia, on relief work there. Returning in the winter, she took up the suggested Cuban work simultaneously with an independent movement of similar character, headed by Dr. Louis Klopsch, proprietor of a religious weekly in New York City. The Government lent its influence to the cause. Several scores of tons of food supplies were donated by private and public benevolence, chiefly in the West, and considerable sums of money were obtained in the East and elsewhere. Among other newspapers actively promoting the good

work was a daily in Omaha, which alone succeeded in raising over \$20,000, in cash and supplies, in a short time.

The President's Account.—With exceptional pleasure President McKinley doubtless penned the following paragraphs of his special message of April 11, 1898: “The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens in Cuba, by the judicious expenditure, through consular agencies, of money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the twenty-fourth of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions, in money or in kind, for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the eighth of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a Central Cuban Relief Committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.

“The efforts of that Committee have been untiring, and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba, and co-operated with the Consul-general and the local authorities to make effective disposition of the relief collected through the efforts of the Central Committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers, and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most if not all of the towns where suffering exists. Thousands of lives have already been

saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish government."

Spanish Relief Illusory.—As a counter to the American Government's revolting expose of the policy of reconcentration, the Spanish cabinet, early in April, 1898, voted three million pesetas—upward of \$600,000—for the starving reconcentrados. Consul-general Lee, when questioned by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on April 12, 1898, had this to say: "I do not believe \$600,000, in supplies, will be given to those people, and the soldiers left to starve. They will divide it up here and there; a piece taken off here, and a piece taken off there. I do not believe they have appropriated anything of the kind. . . . The condition of the reconcentrados out in the country is just as bad as in General Weyler's day. It has been relieved a good deal by supplies from the United States, but that has ceased now.

"General Blanco published a proclamation rescinding General Weyler's bando, as they call it there, but it has had no practical effect. In the first place, these people have no place to go; the houses have been burned down; there is nothing but the bare land there, and it would take them two months before they could raise the first crop. In the next place, they are afraid to go out from the lines of the towns, because the roving bands of Spanish guerillas, as they are called, would kill them. So they stick right in the edges of the town, just like they did, with nothing to eat except what they can get from charity. The Spanish have nothing to give."

BLANCO IN CUBA.

Spanish Politics.—The so-called Liberal Party of Spain, under the leadership of Sagasta (the same who, as Prime Minister, once sent word to President Grant there was not gold enough in the world to buy Cuba), was, to all appearances, gradually undermining the Conservative

Ministry of Canovas, and had become outspoken in its condemnation of General Weyler's severe and futile measures, when, on August 6, 1897, Canovas was assassinated by an obscure anarchistic crank. The Queen Regent immediately designated General Azcarraga, the Minister of War, to serve as head of the cabinet, and for several weeks things went on much as before. Then came the expected "ministerial crisis," the outcome of which was a new cabinet, under Sagasta, pledged to afford Cuba autonomy—home rule—and at the same time to prosecute the war there with increased vigor. Early in October Weyler, a Conservative, placed his resignation in the hands of the new ministry, and a few days later was recalled, one reason for this step, according to a semi-official account, being "the deplorable condition of the sick and wounded soldiers arriving from Cuba." Before sailing for Spain, Weyler accepted an almost riotous ovation from the volunteers of Havana, the ultra-Spanish element of the city, and responded in a speech full of absurd self-glorification. To what extent his twenty months in Cuba had swelled his private fortune cannot be stated, but it is known to have been quite considerable.

Sagasta was a man of less commanding intellect than Canovas, but an adroit politician, and a master hand at the worn-out Spanish game of make-believe and delay. He promised the Washington government many nice things, and really did try to get the Cubans to accept his scheme of autonomy. But the Cuban patriots would have none of it, and, what was no less fatal to it, neither would the Spanish out-and-outers, the Weylerites. However, some twoscore of American prisoners in Cuba were released. Some of them had been in prison seventeen months, and never brought to trial. The Queen Regent graciously forgave their crimes anyhow, at President McKinley's request, which brought many congratulations to the White House and the Department of State.

Blanco's Administration.—Weyler's successor was not Marshal Campos, as many had predicted it would be, but General Ramon Blanco, late Governor-general of the Phillipine Islands, where he had coped successfully with a determined rebellion. In politics he was a Liberal, and in traits of personal character very different from his predecessor. He reached Havana October 31, 1897. He seems to have made an honest effort to carry out the milder policy which, under the pressure of American opinion, had been decided on at Madrid. Before reaching Cuba he had stated, in an interview: "My policy will never include concentration. I fight the enemy, not women and children. One of the first things I shall do will be to greatly extend the zones of cultivation, and to allow the reconcentrados to go out of the towns and till the soil." For the difference at this point between promise and fulfillment General Blanco must not be held alone to blame. The situation has largely overmastered him throughout. The amnesty proclamation, which the Governor-general issued on the eighth of November, fell flat; the insurgents paid no attention to it. Few were the estates, either, on which he was able to start the mills to grinding sugar-cane once more.

Equally inconclusive were his efforts in the field. In its military aspect the war had relapsed into a dogged struggle amid the central provinces, and around the garrisoned points in the two eastern ones. General Pando, in the east, organized the principal expeditions of the winter, and exhausted his ill-rationed columns in gaining petty victories of no lasting value. One cannot help admiring the constancy of the suffering and neglected Spanish soldiery, whose pay in April, 1898, was nine months in arrears for the men, and four months for the officers.

Failure of Autonomy.—It was not without difficulty that Blanco manned the several posts of government when, in

November, 1897, he launched the new autonomous administration, on which Sagasta had built such hopes. The real leaders of public opinion held aloof. Many of them denounced autonomy as a weak concession that endangered the whole fabric of Spanish supremacy. The autonomous office-holders—the Colonial Government, as high-sounding cablegrams phrase it—are mere puppets, with no influence, except as upheld by Spanish bayonets.

As to the Cuban leaders, nothing could be more clear-cut than their stern avowal, a hundred times repeated, to consider no proposal along the lines of home rule under Spanish domination. "Independence or death!" has been their impassioned cry at every step. That it must be independence or nothing, should they have a voice in the settlement, presented diplomacy with a knotty and singularly unwelcome problem. And yet whose right to a voice in the settlement had been better earned? With a terrible emphasis, Gomez issued his warning, even before Blanco had ensconced himself in the palace at Havana, that any person attempting to bring offers of autonomy to his camps would be seized as a spy and shot; and in one case at least the summary order was carried out. Was this savagery, or was it the acme of patriotism?

THE CUBAN REPUBLIC.

Civil Government Organized.—Marti's death (see page 19) delayed the civil organization of the revolutionists, but on September 13, 1895, their first Constituent Assembly met at Camaguey, with twenty members representing all six provinces. It declared Cuba independent, and adopted a constitution for the new government, whose supreme power was vested in a Government Council, to be composed of the President of the Republic, the Vice-president and four Secretaries—those of war, interior, foreign affairs and agriculture—with a sub-secretary for each of these four departments.

It next elected and installed the officers of government. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, chosen President, was the ex-Marquis of Santa Lucia, who formally renounced his title of nobility when he joined the revolution in 1868, and lost his estates by confiscation. Bartolome Masso, of Manzanillo, was elected Vice-president, and Dr. Thomas Estrada Palma, minister plenipotentiary and diplomatic agent abroad, with headquarters in the United States. Gomez was confirmed as General-in-chief of the army, and Maceo as second in command.

Quesada's Statements.—Senor Gonzales de Quesada, charge d'affairs of the Cuban Republic at Washington, is a graduate of the University of New York, and in training thoroughly American. In a recent statement he said: "The civil authorities of the Republic have continued to exercise their functions throughout the territory controlled by the Republic of Cuba, which is about three fourths of the island. There is a Civil Governor in every province, who has his subordinates and employes. The provinces are divided into prefectures, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. The duties of the Prefects are various and are subject to special laws. That these prefectures are in working operation the official telegrams of the Spanish press afford innumerable proof. Documents on file before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations prove that the civil government legislated as to commerce, government workshops, manufactories, coast inspectors, post-offices; that stamps have been issued, public schools established, civil marriages provided for; that the public treasury is well organized, taxes being collected, and amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars; and that President Cisneros and, afterward, President Masso have issued state papers."

Masso's Administration.—The second Constituent Assembly, which met at the end of the constitutional two years, numbered twenty-four members, elected by ballot on the

basis of universal suffrage. It sat during October and November, 1897, Dr. Domingo Mendez Capote, ex-professor of law in Havana University, presiding. Says Quesada: "The outgoing Secretaries of State submitted their reports, which were examined and passed upon by committees appointed for the purpose. A new constitution was adopted on October 29, 1897, which will be in force two years, unless independence is obtained before, when an Assembly is to be called to provide temporarily for the government and administration of the Republic until a definite Constituent Assembly shall meet. The constitution determines what is called the Republic, who are citizens, their individual and political rights, the officers of the government, their power, and provides for the assembling of the representatives." For the new term of two years the Assembly chose former Vice-president Bartolome Masso to be president; Dr. Capote, mentioned above, vice-president, and Jose B. Aleman, secretary of war. By the constitution the latter official is "the superior chief in rank of the Army of Liberty."

A Portable Capital.—Early in the revolution the Cuban capital was set up at Cubitas, which is among the "mountains" of that name north of the city of Puerto Principe (see map.) It has been quite itinerant. In January, 1898, when it happened to be at the village of Espanza, in the Cubitas region, it was raided by a heavy Spanish column and captured, "after a stubborn resistance, which gave the rebel officials time to escape."

Consul-general Lee told the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate: "I have never thought that the insurgents had anything except the skeleton form of a government—a movable capital. I asked one day why they did not have some permanent capital, and I think they gave a very good reason. It would require a large force to protect it and defend it, and they could not afford to mass up their men there; so the capital and the govern-

ment offices had to move where they would be the safest. Whatever may be said about old General Gomez, he is, in my humble opinion, fighting the war in the only way it can be fought—scattering his troops out; because to concentrate would be to starve, having no commissary train and no way to get supplies. They come in sometimes for the purpose of making some little raid, where he thinks it will do something; but he has given orders, so I have always been informed, not to fight in masses, not to lose their cartridges; and sometimes when he gets into a fight, each man is ordered to fire not more than two cartridges. The way the insurgents do is this: They have little patches of sweet potatoes—everything grows there very abundantly in a short time—and Irish potatoes and fruits. They drive their pigs and cattle into the valleys and hillsides, and they use those and scatter out. The insurgents plant crops in many parts of the island."

STRAINED DIPLOMACY.

American Pressure.—President Cleveland tendered Spain his good offices in April, 1896, but they were refused. President McKinley's offers were met less bluntly, but Sagasta was most careful to avoid even a tacit consent to mediation. While he sought to quiet the Washington government with promises, and partial reforms in Cuba, the Spanish war office continued putting forth efforts, such as for a nation literally bankrupt were surprising, to create a navy overmatching the United States upon the ocean. The growing strength of public opinion in this country was irresistibly impelling the Washington government to a policy of moral coercion, notwithstanding the gratifying release of American prisoners, the superseding of Weyler, and the unfailing suavity of General Stewart L. Woodford, the American minister at Madrid since July, 1897. The American people had virtually lost faith in Spain, and, because of her incapacity and cruelty

in Cuba, were fast losing all patience. Official circles, too, showed unmistakable irritation over Spain's pretense that the Cuban war had been so prolonged mainly on account of American failure to enforce neutrality, the facts being this country had already expended \$2,000,000, in Spain's interest, in doing just that thing, and had stopped vastly more Cuban expeditions than the Spanish gunboats had ever intercepted.

The DeLome Letter.—Spain's accomplished representative at Washington was Senor Enrique DeLome, who had been there many years. A confidential letter that he had written to Senor Canalejas, whom Sagasta had sent over early in the winter to quietly investigate the Washington situation, was stolen from the mail by a Cuban sympathizer in the Havana post-office, and sent to the Cuban Junta at New York, by whom carefully photographed copies were made public early in February, 1898. In this letter the Spanish minister abused President McKinley as a "low politician," fatally uncovered the duplicity of his own part in pending negotiations, and distinctly admitted the precariousness of Spain's hold on Cuba. It was impossible, of course, for him to remain at Washington. He cabled his resignation, and it had already been accepted before Minister Woodford went to Sagasta, with a "representation." His successor, in March, was Senor Polo, whose father had held the same post many years before.

The Maine Horror.—At forty minutes past nine on Tuesday night, February 15, 1898, the United States battleship *Maine*, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee commanding, which had been lying quietly at anchor in Havana harbor since the evening of January twenty-fifth, was destroyed by an explosion. Two officers and not less than two hundred and sixty of her crew perished, most of them ground to pieces amid the steel partitions and decks, the others penned by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate sinking of the wreck. The news caused intense

excitement throughout the United States, more especially because treachery was suspected. The Maine was one of the very finest vessels in the American navy, representing, together with her armament and stores, an expenditure closely approximating five millions of dollars. Seldom, if ever, was there a finer example of self-control on the part of a great people, as, for several weeks, the United States stood awaiting the official determination of the cause of this appalling calamity.

Official Findings.—The government at once organized a naval court of inquiry, composed of experienced officers of high rank, who, in their continuous labor of twenty-three days, were aided by a strong force of wreckers and divers, besides experts. They made a thorough investigation on the spot, sifting and weighing every item of evidence that could be adduced. The type-written testimony made a bundle of twelve thousand pages, weighing about thirty pounds. The unanimous finding of the court dated March 21, 1898 (as summarized in President McKinley's message of the twenty-eighth of March), was: "That the loss of the Maine was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew; that the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines; and that no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons."

"The crime or the criminal negligence of the Spanish officials" were essentially the terms in which Congress put the case two weeks later, and in this Congress voiced the conviction of the American people.

WAR PREPARATIONS.

Precautionary Activities.—Preparations comporting with possible hostilities began to be made in both the army and navy departments in January, 1898, and from the date of

the Maine horror were pushed with great energy. The strengthening of coast fortifications and the accumulation and distribution of war material, with recruiting for all branches of service, and arrangements for mobilizing not only the regular army, but the National Guard of the several States, went on apace. There was especial urgency in strengthening the navy. At government and at contractors' shipyards work was pushed night and day. A naval officer was hurried to Europe to buy up every suitable warship on the market, while others were bought in our own ports. In Europe were also purchased hundreds of the smaller cannon and perhaps a thousand tons of ammunition. Old monitors and other discarded craft were overhauled and put in condition for coast-defense. A fleet of auxiliary cruisers began to be organized. The purchase and conversion of merchant vessels soon counted well up into the millions.

On the ninth of March Congress, at the President's request, unanimously voted \$50,000,000 as an emergency fund for the national defense. A few days later it passed a bill adding two regiments of artillery to the regular army; these were sorely needed to man the heavy defensive guns along the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard.

Congress and the People.—Rid of DeLome's presence, the President magnanimously ignored the DeLome letter. His whole nature shrinking from the responsibility of a bloody war, he even forebore making the Maine tragedy the occasion for more than a "representation" to the court of Madrid. But Congress, reflecting the overwhelming sentiment of the nation, was by this time ablaze with indignation and warlike enthusiasm. Herculean were the efforts of the President to control the storm in the interests of peace, through delay. Public opinion grew imperative. It insisted on definite action. The President's message transmitting the Maine findings was sent to Congress on the twenty-eighth of March. His yet

more memorable message of the eleventh of April had been withheld nearly or quite a week, to give time for American residents in Cuba to leave there, and with a lingering hope the situation might yet, in some way, take a pacific turn. In that message the President handed the whole matter over to Congress, and asked for its decision.

Action of Congress.—After several days of impassioned debate, and a prolonged disagreement between the Senate and House of Representatives over the side question of recognizing the existing Republic in Cuba, the action of Congress was given to the world, April 19, 1898, in the following joint resolution, which was approved by the President the following day:

Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore,

Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

1. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

THE CUBAN (SPANISH) DEBT.

The so-called Cuban debt practically represents the amounts which Spain, in order to retain possession of the island, has been obliged to borrow, pledging the Cuban revenues as security. It consists of three classes of stocks (bonds), and of a floating debt in addition, as follows:

Bonds, six per cent loan of 1886.....	\$ 114,194,960
Bonds, five per cent loan of 1890.....	166,215,280
Bonds, five per cent loan of 1896.....	154,880,000
Bonds, total.....	\$ 435,290,240
Add floating debt, January 1, 1898.....	67,760,000
Total.....	\$ 503,050,240

The floating debt has undoubtedly increased since the opening of 1898. Its main items are the heavy arrears due to the army, navy, civil servants and army contractors in Cuba. The enormous total amounts to more than \$300 per capita for the entire population.

RESOURCES AND STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MARCH, 1898.	
Population in 1898 (estimated),.....	74,500,000
Per cent gain in population since 1820,.....	680
Area in square miles, exclusive of Alaska,.....	3,524,880
Military resources in able-bodied men,.....	11,139,788
Naval strength (active list, 13,582; Naval Reserve, 2,800),.....	16,382
Manufactures, annual value, 1897,.....	\$ 9,372,000,000
Imports, 1897,.....	742,630,855
Exports, 1897,.....	1,099,129,519
Revenue, 1897,.....	461,000,000
National wealth, 1898 (estimated),.....	90,000,000,000
Balance in Treasury March 7, 1898,.....	224,864,297
War fund appropriated March 9, 1898,.....	50,000,000

RESOURCES AND STATISTICS OF SPAIN.

MARCH, 1898.	
Population in 1898 (estimated),.....	17,600,000
Per cent gain in population since 1820,.....	60
Population Spanish Colonies, estimated: Porto Rico, 785,000; Philippine Islands, 9,500,000; Spanish Africa, 437,000,.....	10,722,000
Area in square miles, exclusive of colonies, but including the Balearic and Canary Islands,...	202,370
Military resources in able-bodied men, colonies included,.....	4,200,000
Naval strength (active list, 24,269; Naval Reserve, 25,000),.....	49,269
Manufactures, annual value, 1895,.....	\$ 105,000,000
Imports, 1895,.....	160,000,000
Exports, 1895,.....	140,000,000
Revenue, 1895,.....	150,000,000
National wealth, 1895,.....	7,965,000
Balance in Treasury,.....	None
War fund,.....	None

UNITED STATES WAR VESSELS.

APRIL 1, 1898.

First-class Battleships.			Unprotected Cruisers.		
Name.	Tons, Displacement.	Knots, Speed.	Name.	Tons, Displacement.	Knots, Speed.
Indiana,	10,300	15½	Detroit,	2,000	19
Iowa,	11,350	17	Marblehead,	2,000	18½
Massachusetts,	10,300	16	Montgomery,	2,000	19
Oregon,	10,300	16	Gunboats.		
Second-class Battleship.			Bancroft,	840	14
Texas,	6,300	18	Bennington,	1,700	17½
Armored Cruisers.			Castine,	1,200	16
Brooklyn,	9,200	22	Concord, *,	1,700	17
New York,	8,200	21	Helena,	1,400	15½
Armored Ram.			Machias,	1,800	15½
Katahdin,	2,100	16	Nashville,	1,400	19
Armored Coast-defense Vessels.			Petrel, *,	900	12
Amphitrite,	4,000	10½	Wilmington,	1,400	15
Miantonomah,	4,000	10½	Yorktown, †,	1,700	16
Monadnock, *,	4,000	12	Annapolis,	1,000	13
Monterey, *,	4,100	13½	Marietta,	1,000	13
Puritan,	6,000	12½	Newport,	1,000	13
Terror,	4,000	10½	Vicksburg,	1,000	13
Protected Cruisers.			Wheeling (now in Alaska),	1,000	12
Baltimore, *,	4,400	20	Dolphin (Dispatch boat),	1,500	15½
Boston, *,	3,000	16	Vesuvius (Dynamite gunboat), ..	900	21
Charleston, *,	3,700	18	Torpedo-boats.		
Cincinnati,	3,200	19	Cushing,	105	22½
Columbia,	7,400	23	Ericsson,	120	24
Minneapolis,	7,400	23	Foote,	140	24½
Newark, †,	4,100	19	Rodgers,	140	24½
New Orleans,	3,500	20	Winslow,	140	24½
Olympia, *,	5,900	22	Porter,	190	29
Philadelphia, *,	4,300	20	Du Pont,	190	27½
Raleigh, *,	3,200	19	Talbot,	50	20
San Francisco,	4,100	20	Gwyn,	50	20
Topeka,	1,800	20	Stiletto,	30	18
			Somers,	160	23
			Submarine Torpedo-boat.		
			Plunger,	170	8

*On duty in Pacific Ocean. † Out of commission.

Notable additions to this list during April, 1898, were the four Morgan Line steamers (plying between New York and Gulf of Mexico), Prairie, Yosemite, Yankee and Dixie;

and the two American Line steamers (between New York and England), St. Louis and St. Paul. These become auxiliary cruisers, more or less protected, and are especially valuable for their speed. The St. Louis was the fastest transatlantic steamer afloat, with the exception of one Cunarder and one German line vessel.

As will be seen, the foregoing list takes no account of the old monitors, nor the so-called "mosquito fleet," and other auxiliary and coast-defense vessels, aggregating a large number. The Holland diving torpedo-boat at New York, it is understood, has also been purchased by the Government.

SPANISH WAR VESSELS.

MARCH, 1898.

In the modern battleship class Spain has one ship, the Pelayo, which has a displacement of 9,900 tons, about 400 tons less than vessels of the Indiana class. Of second-class battleships Spain has two, the Numancia and Vittoria; both are old broadside ships, lightly plated with wrought-iron. They are slow in speed. Spain's greatest strength is in her armored cruisers, of which she has six, the Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, Viscaya, Princesa Asturias, Carlos V. and Cristobal Colon. These are ships of about 7,000 tons displacement, and each carries a main battery of two 11-inch guns, with a secondary battery of 5-inch, 6-pounder and 1-pounder rapid-fire guns. They have 12 inches of armor on the belt, and 10½ inches on the turrets.

Of unarmored ships of all classes there are the Alphonso XIII., Lepanto, Reina Christina, Reina Mercedes, Alphonso XII., Velasco, Conde Venadito, Don Antonio Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Infanta Isabel, Isabel II., Ensenada, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Filipinas, Nuevo Espana, Galicia, Marquez de Molino, Martin Alonzo Pinzon, Rapido, Temerario, Vincente Yanez Pinzon and Destructor. Of unarmored cruisers the Alphonso XIII. and the Lepanto

are alike in dimensions, though the Lepanto has a displacement of but 4,826 tons, against the other's 5,000. The Reina Christina has a displacement of 3,520 tons, speed $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots; battery, six 6.34-inch, two 9-pounders, three 6-pounders and eight 3-pounders. The Alphonso XII. and the Reina Mercedes are of 3,000 tons displacement and $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots speed. Their batteries are the same as the Reina Christina.

From the 3,000-tonners there is a long drop—down to 1,152 tons in the Velasco. She has a speed of 14.3 knots, and a battery of three 6-inch Armstrong guns and two 2.76-inch breech-loaders. Then follow five 1,130-ton gunboats, from the Conde de Venadito down to the Infanta Isabel, inclusive. Then three similar gunboats of 1,030 tons. Then a miscellaneous list of nine torpedo gunboats, ranging in displacement from 750 to 458 tons. Some of these craft might be available as torpedo-boats, but in general they would add little to the fighting strength of the Spanish navy. In torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers Spain is considerably stronger than the United States. Of the latter, she has six formidable craft, and the United States till lately had none. Spain's obsolete wooden ships, and the large number of toy gunboats mounting each one light gun that she carries on her naval list, need not be itemized. But she has several warships approaching completion or well under way.

In the caliber of guns, America's fighting ships surpass those of Spain. In the Flying Squadron, organized at Hampton Roads, under Commodore W. S. Schley, there are five 13-inch guns, while the whole Spanish navy has not one, and only two 12-inch ones. Our Flying Squadron alone has four 12-inch guns, and of 8-inch guns fourteen. Spain's best four ships have five 11-inch guns, and the rest are mainly 5-inch. The Brooklyn and New York are two of the finest types of fighting ships in the world. Even their main batteries are supplied with rapid-fire guns.

PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S FAMOUS MESSAGE.

The main points, not already quoted, of the President's special message of April 11, 1898, are as follows:

A Half Century of Strife.—The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Present Revolution.—Since the present revolution began in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled, as to the number of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest, by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people, striving to be free, have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state. Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution.

This Country Deeply Affected.—We have found ourselves constrained in the observance of that strict neutrality, which our laws enjoin and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans.

Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and

forbearance of our people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the national legislature, so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention, and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has indeed aroused, the utmost concern on the part of this government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.

Spanish Hauteur.—In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish government then in power to consider any form of mediation, or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished.

[The President then discusses the horrors of reconcentration and the relief measures undertaken (see pages 28 and 31), and proceeds:]

A Peculiar War.—The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both, a condition which, in effect, ended the ten years' war by the truce of Zanjón. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the

present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

Final Negotiations.—Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans, who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the twenty-seventh of March, as a result of much representation and correspondence, through the United States Minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish government looking to an armistice until October 1st for the negotiation of peace, with the good offices of the president.

In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their farms, and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

Spain's Reply.—The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of the thirty-first of March. It offers, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban parliament does not meet until the fourth of May next, the Spanish government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.

Negotiations Fail.—The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of

which are before me—and are substantially in the language above given. The functions of the Cuban parliament in the matter of preparing “peace” and the manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford’s explanatory reports of preliminary discussions preceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish government stands ready to give the insular congress full power to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents—whether by direct negotiations or indirectly by means of legislation does not appear. With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the executive was brought to the end of his effort.

Arguments Against Belligerency.—In my annual message of December last I said: “Of the untried measures there remain: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.”

Thereupon, I reviewed these alternatives in the light of President Grant’s measured words, uttered in 1875, when, after seven years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel barbarities in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible, and that the recognition of belligerent rights was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law.

I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence, which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard, and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerency is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor, the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island.

Arguments Against Recognition.—Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent Government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. [Jackson's argument quoted at length, ended with the following words:]

“Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government; at least until the lapse of time or the course of events should have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long established policy of our government, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.”

Questionable Independence.—I said in my message of December last: “It is to be considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor.”

The same requirement must certainly be no less considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence

is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while on the other hand, influences of and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing state, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary if not rightly eliminable factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or not independent beyond peradventure.

Recognition Unnecessary.—Nor from the standpoint of experience do I think it would be wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to an embarrassing condition of international obligations toward the organization so recognized.

In case of intervention, our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government; we would be required to submit to its direction, and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized, and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

Forms of Intervention.—There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral, by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the United State has virtually been one of friendly intervention in many ways, each not

of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood of American citizens.

The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifice of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.

Grounds of Intervention.—The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say that this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our doors.

2. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no Government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of local protection.

3. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business interests of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

4. And, what is of the utmost importance, the present

condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us, and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant dread, and their property destroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading-vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door, by war-ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

The Maine Tragedy.—These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the fifteenth of February.

The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death—grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.

The Naval Court of Inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.

In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state

of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana, on a mission of peace and rightfully there.

Suggested International Arbitration.—Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our Minister to Spain on the twenty-sixth of March contained the statement that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice requires in the matter of the Maine.

The reply above referred to on the thirty-first of March also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the difference which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note to the Spanish Minister at Washington of the tenth of April, as follows: "As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the report of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by the impartial investigation of experts, which decision Spain accepts in advance." To this I have made no reply.

[After quoting President Grant's views, in 1875, of the ten years' war in Cuba, the President closes thus:]

Referred to Congress.—The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain wages war cannot be attained.

The fire of insurrection may flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been, and it is plain that it cannot be, extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which cannot longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba.

In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these acts and these considerations, I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of obtaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens, as well as our own, and to use the naval and military forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes; and in the interest of humanity, and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

A Solemn Responsibility.—The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed on me by the Constitution and law, I await your action.

Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree by the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the details of which have not been communicated to me.

This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Executive Mansion, April 11th.

NAVAL WAR LOCALITIES.

Cape Verde Islands.—A group of islands in the Atlantic ocean off the westernmost point of Africa, in the same latitude as the Central American State of Honduras. They belong not to Spain, but to Portugal, whose obligations as a neutral will require her to forbid their use by a Spanish fleet as a base of hostile operations against the United States. From these islands to Porto Rico is 2,500 miles.

Canary Islands.—A group of islands, belonging to Spain, off the west coast of Africa, in about the same latitude as Tampa, Florida. Population, nearly all of Spanish or mixed origin, is about 310,000. The capital, Santa Cruz de Santiago ("Holy Cross of St. Jago"), is on the island of Teneriffe, near the famous peak of the same name, and hence is sometimes spoken of as Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, or simply Teneriffe. The Canaries are a very valued possession of Spain, which would regard their conquest by us as more humiliating than even the loss of Cuba.

Porto (or Puerto) Rico.—The fourth in size of the West India Islands. It has hitherto belonged to Spain. It is about 450 miles east of Cuba, from which it is separated by Hayti and the adjoining straits. Length, about 95 miles, and greatest breadth, 36 miles. Area, 3,550 square miles, with a population of not quite 800,000. Principal towns, San Juan de Puerto Rico (commonly abbreviated to San Juan), Mayaguez, Ponce, Arecibo, Aguadilla and Guayama. The first-named is the capital. The seizure of this island by the United States would be a serious, if not fatal, matter for the Spanish cause in Cuba.

Danish Islands.—The three Danish islands in the West Indies are respectively situated about fifty to seventy miles east of Porto Rico. St. Croix (or Santa Cruz), the southernmost of them, is considerably the largest, yet contains only eighty-five square miles, with a population of about 20,000. The other two are St. Thomas and St. John.

A List of Cities, Towns, Villages, Capes, Bays, Peninsulas, and Names of Other Places and Points in Cuba.

NOTE.—To find the location on the map, notice the capital letter and figure at end of the line containing the name.

On the map, find that figure printed at the top or bottom of the page between the border lines, draw an imaginary line straight down the page to a point where it intersects a line drawn from the capital letter similarly designated, at the sides of the map. For illustration, the point on the map at which Havana is located is designated as L 12, and it will be found on the map by following the directions here given.

Abad del Jibaro.....	R 24	Baez.....	O 22
Acerraderos	Y 36	Baga.....	S 32
Aguacato.....	M 14	Bagazar.....	P 19
Aguadores.....	Y 38	Bahia de Guantanamo.....	Y 39
Aguica	N 18	Bahiahonda.....	M 9
Alacranes	M 15	Baire	W 35
Alaeranes (Cape).....	M 7	Baja.....	N 5
Albufera de Cortes.....	Q 6	Bajos de los Colorados.....	P 2
Algodonai.....	R 23	Banao.....	R 29
Alquizar.....	N 11	Banes.....	L 11
Alvarez.....	N 19	Baracoa.....	W 43
Amarillas.....	O 18	Barajagua.....	V 37
Amaro.....	N 21	Barrancas.....	W 34
Amiot.....	M 9	Ba. Santa Maria.....	S 26
Ana Sta.....	M 15	Ba. Sta. Clara.....	L 18
Aposentos.....	X 32	Batabano.....	N 12
Ariguanab.....	M 11	Bayamo.....	W 34
Armaso.....	P 20	B. de Matanzas.....	L 15
Arroyo Blanco.....	T 29	Bejucal.....	M 12
Artemisa.....	M 10	Bemba.....	M 16
Auras.....	U 36	Bermeja.....	M 15
Bacunagua.....	O 9	Berrocal.....	U 31

Blanco (Cape).....	R 22	C. de Lucrecia.....	T 38
B. Majana.....	N 10	Ceja de Pablo.....	M 19
Boca de Carabelas.....	Q 31	Cerro Guayabo.....	X 40
Boca de Jaruco.....	L 13	Chirigota.....	N 9
Boca de la Ciénaga (Isla de Pinos).....	R 10	Ciego.....	O 20
Boca de la Yana o' de Moron.....	O 27	Ciego Alonso.....	O 20
Belondron.....	Q 2	Ciego de Avila.....	Q 26
Bolondron.....	M 16	Ciénaga de Zapata.....	N 15
Buena Vista.....	N 18	Cienfuegos (Pop. 40,364).....	P 19
Burro (Cape).....	V 41	Cifuentes.....	M 21
B'y Albufera de Guadiana.....	P 4	Ciracuse.....	Q 22
Cabaiguan.....	P 23	Cocurucho.....	Q 22
Cabanas.....	M 10	Coliseo.....	M 16
Cabezas.....	M 15	Coloma.....	P 7
Cabo de Cruz.....	Y 30	Colon.....	N 18
Cabo de S. Antonio.....	Q 1	Concha.....	M 21
Caibarien.....	N 23	Conchitas (Cape).....	P 30
Caimanera.....	Y 39	Congojas.....	O 19
Caimito.....	M 17	Consolacion del Sur.....	O 7
Caimito de la Hanabana.....	O 17	Corojo.....	R 29
Caimito del Norte.....	O 18	Corral Falso.....	M 16
Cajio.....	N 11	Corral Nuevo.....	M 13
Calabazar.....	N 22	Corral Nuevo.....	L 15
Cala de Ovando.....	X 44	Corrientes Bay.....	R 3
Caleta de Munoz.....	Q 21	Corrientes (Cape).....	R 4
Calgranabo.....	N 7	Cs. de Ana Maria.....	S 25
Calimete.....	N 18	Cs. de Guainabo.....	O 24
Calvario.....	L 12	Cs. de Manzanillo.....	W 32
Camaguey (northern point of Eastern Trocha).....	P 27	Cs. de Tana.....	V 31
Camajuani.....	N 22	Cubitas.....	R 30
Camarioca.....	L 16	Cumanayagua.....	P 21
Camaronas.....	O 17	Cupey.....	W 36
Camarones.....	M 17	Datil.....	W 34
Canas.....	L 15	De Anton o' El Barril.....	O 29
Canasi.....	L 15	De la Jaula (Cape).....	N 27
Candelaria.....	M 10	Eastern Trocha.....	P Q R S 26
Caney.....	X 38	E. Sta. Teresa.....	P 17
Caney.....	X 32	El Calvario.....	P 16
Canimar.....	M 16	El Cobre.....	X 37
Cano.....	M 12	El Coreado.....	R 30
Cantel.....	L 16	El Jobo.....	M 14
Caobillas.....	N 17	Emb. de Caraballas.....	M 20
Caraballe.....	L 14	Emb. del Mail.....	M 19
Carabatas.....	M 20	Emb. de Sabanabamar.....	S 26
Cardenas.....	L 17	Emb. Sierra Merena.....	M 19
Cartagena.....	O 19	Eneco del Santo.....	M 22
Cascorro.....	T 31	Enramada.....	X 37
Casigua.....	M 13	Ens. de Aroyo Seco.....	T 38
Cauto.....	V 34	Ens. de Baja.....	N 5
Cauto Abajo.....	W 37	Ens. de Birama.....	V 32
Cauto del Embarcadero.....	V 33	Ens. de Canete.....	V 42
Cayadel Rey.....	W 38	Ens. de Davaniguas.....	O 8
Cayaguani.....	P 22	Ens. de la Herradura.....	S 36
Cayajabos.....	M 10	Ens. del Junco.....	V 29
Cayamas.....	V 33	Ens. del Ojo del Toro.....	Y 31
Cayo de Cruz.....	O 30	Ens. de Marianao.....	L 11
Cayuelo de la Guajaba.....	O 31	Ens. de Mora.....	Y 31
C. de Catalina.....	W 40	Ensenada de Corrientes.....	Q 3
C. de Guanios.....	X 44	Ermito Vieja.....	R 29
C. de la Sulina.....	O 24	Esperanza.....	N 21

